The Functions Of Netbios Computer Science Essay

The Functions Of Netbios Computer Science EssayNetBIOS was developed by IBM and sytek as an API for lymph node softw are to approach LAN resources anda also for retrieveing lucreing run. Netbios has extended its serve ups to use netbios interface to operate on IBM token ring architecture.Netbios( mesh topology central enter/output ashes) is a programme which each(prenominal)ows communication surrounded by applications of several(predicate) computer to communicate with in a LAN . netbios allow applications to let out on interlocking and isolate program of laboredware dependencies.In fresh Microsoft windows operational carcasss NetBIOS is included as a part of NETBIOS extended substance abuser interface(NetBEUI) and it is also utilise in Ethernet and token ring. NetBIOS frees the application from understanding the enlarge of network including error recovery and request is provided in the form of a Network control block (NCB) specifies a message location and the lay down of a destination.NetBIOS provides serve for session and trans way serve in the OSI cast with out all selective information format . the standard format is provided by NetBUI. Netbios provides two communication modes session and the datagram among which session mode provides conversation among computers which provides error detection and error recovery.NetBIOS provides an API(application program interface) for software developers which includes network touch base functions and commands which shtup be incorporated into software programs. For example, a programmer post use a prewritten NetBIOS function to enable a software program to access another(prenominal) de ill-doings on a network. This is much easier than writing the networking reckon from scratch.The communication in NetBIOS is carried out using a format called network control blocks . the allocation of these blocks is based on the users program and is reserved for commentary and output respectively.Netbios sup looks connection oriented (transmission control protocol) and connectionless(UDP) communication and also shell oute and multicasting services like naming, session and datagramFUNCTIONS of NETBIOSNetbios allows applications to talk to for each champion other using protocols like TCP/IP which supports netbios.netbios is a session/transport layer protocol which fanny be apprehendn as netbeui and netbt . the main function sof NetBIOS areStarting and stop sessions get registrationSession layer data exchange(reliable)Datagram data transfer (un reliable)Protocol driver and network adapter management functionsGeneral or NETBIOS statusThis service helps in gathering the information about aparticular network name and terminate a trace at topical anesthetic or a remote system.NETBIOS name servicesNetBIOS name table (NBT) service processes keister be used with active directories comp wizardnts, domains and workgroups. The system details can be enumerated by querying the name serv ice. Add, add group, delete and find, the naming services provide the cap expertness to install a LAN adapter card can be done using netbios name services.NETBIOS Session goSession services provides stylemark across workgroups and provides access to resources like sticks and printers. at one time the authentication is done session services provide reliable data transfer by establishing sessions between name over which data can be transmitted. Messages that are send are ac neckledge by the receiving station, if an pass judgment acknowledgement is not received the sender retransmit the messageNETBIOS Datagram servicesThe datagram services are used to define the personal manner in which a host encapsulates information to netbios header , so that when a request occurs the information from the header is extracted and stores it in the cache. Datagram services allows sending messages one by one, broadcast without requiring a connection. The messages can be send to different network s by knoeing psyche names or group names.http//www.fvsolutions.com/Support/index3.htm2. How can NetBIOS be used to enumerate a Domain, a HostNetBIOS Enumeration Utility (NBTEnum) is a utility for Windows that can be used to enumerate NetBIOS information from one host or a range of hosts. The enumerated information includes the network transports, NetBIOS name, eyeshade lockout threshold, logged on users, local groups and users, global groups and users, and shares.If run under the context of a valid user account additional information is enumerated including operating system information, services, installed programs, Auto Admin Logon information and encrypted WinVNC/RealVNC intelligences. This utility depart also perform give-and-take checking with the use of a dictionary file. Runs on Windows NT 4.0/2000/XP/2003. PERL source included.Examples * nbtenum -q 192.168.1.1 Enumerates NetBIOS information on host 192.168.1.1 as the null user.* nbtenum -q 192.168.1.1 johndoe Enumerat es NetBIOS information on host 192.168.1.1 as user johndoe with a neat password.* nbtenum -a iprange.txt Enumerates NetBIOS information on all hosts condition in the iprange.txt input file as the null user and checks each user account for blank passwords and passwords the same as the username in frown case.* nbtenum -s iprange.txt dict.txt Enumerates NetBIOS information on all hosts specify in the iprange.txtinput file as the null user and checks each user account for blank passwords and passwords the same as the username in lower case and all passwords specified in dict.txt if the account lockout threshold is 0.http//www.secguru.com/ tangency/nbtenum_netbios_enumeration_utility3. What vulnerabilities are associated with netbios and how they can be victimized?The following are the some of the vulneabilities of the netbios and their exploitationsWindows NetBIOS draw Conflicts pictureThe Microsoft Windows execution of NetBIOS allows an unsolicited UDP datagram to remotely de ny access to services offered by registered NetBIOS names. An assaulter can remotely shut down all Domain Logins, the ability to access SMB shares, and NetBIOS name resolution services.Vulnerable systemsMicrosoft Windows 95Microsoft Windows 98Microsoft Windows NTMicrosoft Windows 2000NetBIOS Name Conflicts, defined in RFC 1001 (15.1.3.5), occur when a unique NetBIOS name has been registered by more than one node. Under prescript circumstances, name conflicts are detect during the NetBIOS name denudation process. In other words, a NetBIOS name should just be marked in conflict when an end node is actively resolving a NetBIOS name.The delivery of an unsolicited NetBIOS Conflict datagram to any Microsoft Windows operating system will place a registered NetBIOS name into a conflicted state. Conflicted NetBIOS names are effectively shut down since they cannot respond to name discovery requests or be used for session establishment, sending, or receiving NetBIOS datagrams.The security implications of conflict a NetBIOS name depend upon the NetBIOS name bear on. If the NetBIOS names associated with the Computer browser service are conflicted, utilities such as Network Neighborhood may become unusable. If the Messenger table service is alter, the net send command equivalents are unusable. If NetLogon is conflicted, Domain logons can not be authenticated by the affected server, thus allowing an attacker to systematically shutdown the NetLogon service on all domain controllers in crop to deny domain services. Finally, conflicting the master of ceremonies and Workstation Services will stop access to shared out resources and many fundamental NetBIOS services such as NetBIOS name resolution.Microsoft Windows 9x NETBIOS password verification exposure.A vulnerability exists in the password verification shunning utilized by Microsoft Windows 9x NETBIOS protocol implementation. This vulnerability will allow any user to access the Windows 9x file shared service w ith password protection. Potential attackers dont grow to know the share password.Vulnerable systems Microsoft Windows 95 Microsoft Windows 98 Microsoft Windows 98 Second readingImmune systems Windows NT 4.0 Windows 2000 allone can set a password to protect Microsoft Windows 9x systems shared resources. But a vulnerability in the password verification scheme can be used to bypass this protection. To verify the password, the length of the password depends on the length of the data sent from client to server. That is, if a client sets the length of password to a 1 byte and sends the packet to server, the server will only compare the prime(prenominal) byte of the shared password, and if there is a match, the authentication will be complete (the user will be apt(p) access). So, all an attacker need to do is to guess and try the first byte of password in the victim. Windows 9x remote management system is also affected since it adopts the same share password authentication method.Expl oitHere is one simple example to demonstrate this bug. Get samba source packet and modify source/client/client.c like this samba-2.0.6.orig/source/client/client.c Thu Nov 11 103559 1999+++ samba-2.0.6/source/client/client.c Mon Sep 18 212029 2000 -1961,12 +1961,22 struct cli_state *do_connect(char *serveDEBUG(4,( session setup okn))+/*if (cli_send_tconX(c, share, ,password, strlen(password)+1)) DEBUG(0,(tree connect failed %sn, cli_errstr(c)))cli_shutdown(c)return NULL+*/++ password0 = 0+ c-sec_mode = 0+ do++ password0+=1++ while(cli_send_tconX(c, share, , password, 1)) speck in NetBIOS Could Lead to Information DisclosureNetwork basic input/output system (NetBIOS) is an application-programming interface (API) that can be used by programs on a local area network (LAN). NetBIOS provides programs with a reproducible set of commands for requesting the lower-level services required to manage names, conduct sessions, and send datagrams between nodes on a network.This vulnerability inv olves one of the NetBT (NetBIOS over TCP) services, namely, the NetBIOS Name Service (NBNS). NBNS is analogous to DNS in the TCP/IP world and it provides a way to find a systems IP address given its NetBIOS name, or vice versa.Under certain conditions, the response to a NetBT Name Service query may, in addition to the typical reply, contain random data from the print systems memory. This data could, for example, be a segment of HTML if the user on the point system was using an Internet browser, or it could contain other types of data that exist in memory at the time that the repoint system responds to the NetBT Name Service query.An attacker could try on to exploit this vulnerability by sending a NetBT Name Service query to the target system and then examine the response to gossip if it included any random data from that systems memory.If best security practices have been followed and port 137 UDP has been close up at the firewall, Internet based attacks would not be possible. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker would have to be able to send a specially-crafted NetBT request to port 137 on the target system and then examine the response to see whether any random data from that systems memory is included. In intranet environments, these ports are unremarkably accessible, notwithstanding systems that are connected to the Internet usually have these ports impede by a firewall.How could an attacker exploit this vulnerability?An attacker could seek to exploit this vulnerability by sending NetBT Name Service queries to a target system and then examining the responses for arbitrary data from the target systems memory.NetBIOS Name master of ceremonies Protocol Spoofing (Patch available)Microsoft has released a patch that eliminates a security vulnerability in the NetBIOS protocol implemented in Microsoft Windows systems. This can be exploited to cause a denial of service attack.Affected Software Versions Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 Workstation Microsoft W indows NT 4.0 innkeeper Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 Server, Enterprise magnetic declination Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 Server, Terminal Server Edition Microsoft Windows 2000The NetBIOS Name Server (NBNS) protocol, part of the NetBIOS over TCP/IP (NBT) family of protocols, is implemented in Windows systems as the Windows Internet Name Service (WINS). By design, NBNS allows network peers to assist in managing name conflicts. Also by design, it is an unauthenticated protocol and therefore subject to spoofing. A malicious user could misuse the Name Conflict and Name release mechanisms to cause another machine to conclude that its name was in conflict. Depending on the scenario, the machine would as a result either be otiose to register a name on the network, or would relinquish a name it already had registered. The result in either case would be the same the machine would not respond requests sent to the conflicted name anymore.If normal security practices have been followed, and port 1 37 UDP has been blocked at the firewall, external attacks would not be possible.A patch is available that changes the behavior of Windows systems in order to give administrators additional flexibility in managing their networks. The patch allows administrators to configure a machine to only accept a name conflict datagram in direct response to a name registration attempt, and to configure machines to deflect all name release datagrams. This will reduce but not eliminate the threat of spoofing. Customers needing additional protection may wish to believe using IPSec in Windows 2000 to authenticate all sessions on ports 137-139.Patch handiness Windows 2000http//www.microsoft.com/Downloads/Release.asp?ReleaseID=23370 Windows NT 4.0 Workstation, Server, and Server, EnterpriseEditionPatch to be released shortly. Windows NT 4.0 Server, Terminal Server Edition Patch to bereleased shortly.4. How can the security problems associated with netbios be mitigated? argue against external NetBIOS connectionsIf NetBIOS has to be allowed, the first step is to ensure that only a very small number of devices are accessible. As youll see, leaving your network open to external NetBIOS traffic significantly increases the complexity of system hardening. complexness is the enemy of system assurance.Next, ensure that the exposed systems are hardened by,crippling the systems ability to support null sessionsDefining very strong passwords for the local administrator accountsDefining very strong passwords for shares, assuming you absolutely have to have shares on exposed systemsKeeping the Guest account modifyUnder no circumstances allowing access to the root of a hard drive via a shareUnder no circumstances overlap the Windows or WinNT directories or any directory located beneath themCrossing your fingersMitigating FactorsAny information disclosure would be completely random in nature.By default, Internet Connection Firewall (ICF) blocks those ports. ICF is available with Windows XP a nd Windows Server 2003.To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must be able to send a specially crafted NetBT request to port 137 on the destination computer and then examine the response to see whether any random data from that computers memory is included. For intranet environments, these ports are typically accessible, but for Internet-connected computers, these ports are typically blocked by a firewallSome of the ways in which the intruder can be prevented from attacking the target system areLimit the network hosts that can access the service.Limit the user who accesses the service.Configure service which allows only authenticated connections.Limit the degree of access that would permit a user to change configuration of networks.linkshttp//www.securiteam.com/windowsntfocus/5WP011F2AA.htmlhttp//www.securiteam.com/windowsntfocus/5MP02202KW.htmlhttp//www.securiteam.com/windowsntfocus/5DP03202AA.htmlhttp//www.secguru.com/link/nbtenum_netbios_enumeration_utilityhttp//www.securit yzero.com/uploaded_files/vulnerabilities_report.pdfhttp//www.securiteam.com/exploits/5JP0R0K4AW.htmlhttp//www.windowsitpro.com/article/netbios/information-disclosure-vulnerability-in-microsoft-netbios.aspxhttp//www.informit.com/articles/article.aspx?p=130690seqNum=11http//www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS03-034.mspxhttp//marc.info/?l=bugtraqm=96480599904188w=2http//descriptions.securescout.com/tc/14002http//www.securityspace.com/smysecure/viewreport.html?repid=3style=k4http//blogs.techrepublic.com.com/security/?p=196